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LAWFUL COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
By ERNEST C. CARMAN*
T may be confidently asserted that with one exception' the deci-
sions arising under the Federal Anti-Trust Act2 have filled
more pages of the law reports than can be traced to any other
enactment of the Congress of the United States. With equal
assurance it may be said that no other federal statute is enveloped
in as much of judicial uncertainty and irreconcilable interpreta-
tion. It may be justly criticised more than any other statute as
having an inherent aptitude and docility for meaning whatever
a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States, as constituted at any particular time, think it then ought
to mean.3 The singular inconstancy of that great court in inter-
preting the Sherman Anti-Trust Act may be justified by its con-
cept of the imperative necessity for a flexible statute designed to
curb monopoly in interstate and foreign commerce. But these
considerations, while desirably terrifying to malefactors of greats
wealth, are not reassuring to well-intentioned business men con-
fronted in various fields with the necessity of adjusting pro-
duction and sale to consuming requirements through co6perative
effort without any means of knowing whether, in subsequent
review, the hindsight of the Supreme Court will commend their
genius for normal trade or condemn them to bankruptcy and'
years of servitude in federal prisons for having guessed poorly
about the future mental attitude of the future justices of the
Court.
Can any guiding principles of permanent worth be extracted
from the decisions for the benefit of men, or combinations of
*Of the Los Angeles, California, bar.
'The act to Regulate Commerce, U. S. C. tit. 49, secs. 1-40, 49 U. S.
C. A., secs. 1-40, Mason's Code, tit. 49, secs. 1-40.2Sherman Act of July 2, 1890, U. S. C. tit. 15, secs. 1-7, 15 U. S. C. A.
secs. 1-7, Mason's Code, tit. 15, secs. 1-7.3Nearly all the leading cases except those involving railroad combines
have been decided by a much divided court. Twenty-six justices have
participated in the decisions interpreting the Sherman Act; namely, Fuller.
Field, Harlan, Gray, Brewer, Brown, Shiras, White, Peckham, McKenna,
Holmes, Day, Moody, Lurton, Hughes, Van Devanter, Lamar, Pitney, Mc-
Reynolds, Brandeis, Clarke, Taft, Sutherland, Butler, Sanford and Stone.
There is less unanimity in the anti-trust decisions of the past year (pre-
ceding Sept. 1, 1927) than in the first year of interpretation of the Act-
the year 1895. See notes following.
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men, desirous of cooperating to effect economies in business and
to stabilize industry and prices without violating or evading the
mandate of the law against monopoly and restraint of trade? The
difficulty in answering this query is made apparent by some of
the outstanding decisions.
Before the Federal Anti-Trust Act first came to the notice
of the Supreme Court, the entire country had become alarmed
by menacing monopolies which were beyond the reach of state
statutes in respect to their transactions in interstate commerce
and outside the restraining precepts of the common law, which
never has pervaded the federal domain. At the outset the Su-
preme Court was quick to limit the act to interstate and for-
eign trade and commerce,' but sweeping and emphatic in its dec-
larations that the act unconditionally prohibited all combinations
in restraint of such trade, whether good or bad or of little or
great effect.5 This interpretation had the virtue of simplicity,
however economically unsound or impractical it may have been.
It did not long prevail. In the year 1904 the members of the
Court, having before them a great holding company,6 became
'divided in their allegiance to the interpretation condemning all
combinations as declared in the previous decisions of the Court.
Five of the justices adhered to this rule, while four of them
dissented and contended for the "rule of reason." Two of the
justices on each side of this divided Court died7 and their places
were filled before the next great cases" were decided in the year
1911, but all of the new justices were then won to the "rule of
4United States v. E. C. Knight Co., (1895) 156 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct.
249, 39 L. Ed. 325.5United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, (1897) 166 U. S.
290, 17 Sup. Ct. 540, 41 L. Ed. 1007; United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n.
(1898) 171 U. S. 505, 19 Sup. Ct. 25, 43 L. Ed. 259; Hopkins v. United
States, (1898) 171 U. S. 578, 19 Sup. Ct. 40, 43 L. Ed. 290; Anderson v.
United States, (1898) 171 U. S. 604, 19 Sup. Ct. 50, 43 L. Ed. 300; Addy-
stone Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, (1899) 175 U. S. 211, 20 Sup. Ct:
96, 44 L. Ed. 136; W. W. Montague & Co. v, Lowry, (1904) 193 U. S. 38,
24 Sup. Ct. 307, 48 L. Ed. 608.6United States v. Northern Securities Co., (1904) 193 U. S. 197, 24
Sup. Ct. 436, 48 L, Ed. 679.
,Justices Brown and Brewer on the majority side of the court in the
Northern Securities Case had passed; as had also Justices Fuller and
Peckham of the dissenting minority. Their places had been filled by Jus-
tices Hughes, Lurton, Lamar and Van Devanter before the decision in the
Standard Oil case in which the "rule of reason" was adqpted without any
dissent except that of Justice Harlan.8United States v. Standard Oil Co., (1910) 221 U. S. 1, 31 Sup. Ct.
502, 55 L. Ed. 619; United States v. American Tobacco Co., (1910) 221
U. S. 106, 31 Sup. Ct. 632, 55 L. Ed. 663.
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reason"-that the statute condemns only contracts, acts or com-
binations which are unreasonably restrictive of competitive con-
ditions. It can hardly be doubted that economic necessity was
the mother of this liberalizing interpretation. It gave the statute
the virtue of flexibility, but clothed it in complexity and plagued
it with uncertainty such as the same Court has seldom permitted
in penal statutes even of the same class.9
In the second of these decisions 0 the Court, however, took
occasion to warn all persons that the statute would be interpreted
as covering every conceivable act in furtherance of unreasonable
restraint of trade "without regard to the garb in which such acts
are clothed." But corporate greed was not thus easily to be
taught its lesson; and only a year and a half later the Court
struck down a vicious monopoly" by reverting to its earlier tenet
of the year 1904 which had condemned the bare existence of a
combination having power, whether exerted or not, to monopo-
9In Nash v. United States, (1913) 229 U, S. 373, 33 Sup. Ct. 780, 57
L. Ed. 1232, the court upheld the criminal provisions of the Sherman Act
against attack on the ground of uncertainty arising from the "rule of
reason" which was declared to be definitely understood in the common law.
The Court said (Justice Pitney dissenting)' that "the law is full of in-
stances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as
the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree. If his judgment
is wrong, not only may he incur a fine or a short imprisonment as here;
he may incur the penalty of death." This was consistent with an earlier
decision sustaining similar penal provisions in a state statute. Waters-
Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, (1908) 212 U. S. 86, 29 Sup. Ct. 220, 53 L. Ed.
417. But shortly thereafter the court struck down a Kentucky penal statute
which made it a crime for any trade combination to fix prices of any
commodity at more or less than its real value or market value under nor-
real conditions. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, (1913) 234 U.
S. 216, 34 Sup. Ct. 853, 58 L. Ed. 1284. The Court declared this provision
offered "no standard of conduct that it is possible to know," hence that
it was too vague and uncertain for a penal statute! And on May 31st, 1927,
the Court, without any dissent, struck down the penal provisions of the
Colorado Anti-Trust Act as failing to describe the crime there created
with requisite certainty. Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., (1926) 274 U. S. 445,
47 Sup. Ct. 681, 71 L. Ed. 1146, The Colorado Act was substantially iden-
tical with the Sherman Act except that it had been rationalized with a pro-
viso that trade combinations should not be deemed violators of the statute
where their concerted action was only for the purpose, and with the ef-
fect, of obtaining a reasonable price for their products, etc. Hence it ap-
pears that the "rule of reason" is not too uncertain in the Federal Anti-
Trust Act, but that the determination of a reasonable price as a basis of
criminal liability is too uncertain in a state anti-trust act. See United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., (1926) 273 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct. 377, 71
L. Ed. 404. It is interesting to note that the Colorado Act was almost
identical in its language with the California Cartwright Anti-Trust Act(Calif, Stat. 1907, p. 984 as amended by Calif. Stat. 1909, p. 593) which
it may be assumed is also unconstitutional.
lOUnited States v. American Tobacco Co., (1910) 221 U. S. 106, 31
Sup. Ct. 632, 55 L. Ed. 663.
"United States v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., (1912) 226 U. S. 61, 33 Sup.
Ct. 53, 57 L. EdL 124.
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lize or restrain interstate trade and commerce. This decision
was still new when the attention of the nation was diverted to
the world war. In the reconstruction period following the close
of that great conflict, with domestic and world trade at its worst,
the government asked the Court to dissolve the United States
Steel Corporation 12 not because of any proved evils arising from
its operation but merely because it was a gigantic combination
with power to monopolize or restrain trade. This the Court, in
a decision by less than a majority of the justices,13 refused to
do. The economic wisdom of that decision, viewed in the light
of the time when it was rendered, can hardly be doubted. But
it cannot be wholly reconciled with any decision before or since.
The Court not only re-adopted its "rule of reason" but further
declared that the size of a combination, the extent of its unex-
erted power to restrain competition, and its previous unsuccess-
ful efforts to do so, are all matters of little or no consequence;
and that the Federal Anti-Trust Act is directed against the real-
ization of monopoly and not against a mere expectation of it.
Less than two months later the court, having before it the
most objectionable business coalition ever formed in this coun-
try,14 emphatically declared that the mere existence of power in
such organization to monopolize, "regardless of the use made of
it," constituted a violation of the Federal Anti-Trust Act. To
justify this ruling the Court said that such power had been as-
sembled in the combination before it "by deliberate, calculated pur-
chase for control" and "not by normal expansion to meet the
demands of business growing as a result of superior and enter-
prising management." If this was not a distinction without a
difference, then it merely extracted another complex and uncertain
test from the Federal Anti-Trust Act by which to determine the
legality or illegality of trade combinations.' 5
'
2United States v. United States Steel Corporation, (1919) 251 U. S.
417, 40 Sup. Ct. 293, 64 L Ed. 343.
'
3 justices McReynolds and Brandeis took no part in the decision.
This left a Court of seven justices which by a bare majority of four (Jus-
ices White, McKenna, Holmes, and Van Devanter) rendered the decision.
Justices Day, Pitney, and Clarke dissented.
14United States v. Reading Co., (1919) 253 U. S. 26, 40 Sup. Ct. 425,
64 L. Ed. 760, which involved a monopoly of the principal anthracite coal
deposits of the United States and a vicious railroad combination for the
purpose of transporting same, all together dominated by the same group
of individuals and characterized by a flagrant disregard for all laws (writ-
ten and unwritten) relating to monopoly, price fixing and fair trade com-
petition. In these circumstances, the broad and sweeping language of Jus-
tice Clarke in the opinion of the Court may be taken with a grain of salt
in its application to more decent trade combinations. The decision of the
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In the cases just discussed it appeared that the combinations
there involved had all been effected through holding companies
or purchase of stock control. But another kind of trade organ-
ization had also appeared in the Supreme Court--the loose vol-
untary association not involving stock ownership or interlock-
ing directorates. Set up like tenpins to be knocked down
promptly, these associations nevertheless led the Court farther
into the field of political economy than it had gone in its deci-
sions upon intercorporate relations; and the result was somewhat
beneficial.
After condemning a retail association that blacklisted whole-
salers for selling at retail,1" failing to be convinced of the sin-
cerity of an organization formed for the alleged purpose of pro-
moting competition, 17 and placing the ban of judicial disap-
proval on the operation of a central bureau which divided the
country into zones for price quoting, 8 the Court declared that
the Federal Anti-Trust Act does not prohibit the formation of
voluntary associations of manufacturers for the purpose of gath-
ering and disseminating among their members all available in-
formation as to the cost of their product, the volume of pro-
duction, the actual price which the product has brought in past
transactions, stocks of merchandise on hand, approximate cost
of transportation from the principal point of shipment to the
points of consumption, and similar information, all discussed
and to be discussed in meetings from time to time of the mem-
bers of such associations, provided there is no attempt to reach
any agreement or any concerted action with respect to prices
or production or restraining competition."9 The Court said that
court, however, was unanimous except as to a dissent of three justices
(White, Holmes, and Van Devanter) which went only to the form of relief
to be granted.
15United States v. Lehigh Valley Ry. Co., (1920) 254 U. S. 255, 41
Sup. Ct. 104, 65 L. Ed, 253, had to do with a combine very similar to The
one so emphatically condemned in the Reading Case. The same result
followed. Justices McReynolds and Brandeis took no part; and there was
a statement by Justices White and Holmes indicating that they concurred
in the whole of the opinion not from conviction but because of previous
decisions of the court.
'
8 Eastern Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. United States, (1914)
234 U. S. 600, 34 Sup. Ct. 951, 58 L. Ed. 1490.
2l7American Colilmn & Lumber Co. v. United States, (1921) 257 U. S.
377, 42 Sup. Ct. 114, 66 L. Ed. 284. Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Mc-
Kenna dissented.18United States v. American Linseed Oil Co. (1923) 262 U. S. 371, 43
Sup. Ct. 607, 67 L. Ed. 1035.
'
9Maple Floor Manufacturers' Association v. United States, (1925)
268 U. S. 563, 45 Sup. Ct. 578, 69 L. Ed. 1093. Justices McReynolds, Taft,
and Sanford dissented.
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such activities sans agreement left each manufacturer free to
produce, although prudence and business foresight based thereon
might influence free choice in favor of more limited production;
that competition does not become less free merely because the
conduct of commercial operations becomes more intelligent
through the free distribution of knowledge of all the essential
factors of such operations; that the Federal Anti-Trust Act does
not inhibit the intelligent conduct of business operations; and, in
effect, that any course of conduct or action which tends to pre-
vent overproduction and lessen the economic disturbances at-
tendant thereon, to avoid waste, to stabilize trade and industry,
and to produce fairer price levels, is lawful and permissible so
long as it is not based upon agreement or concerted action to
lessen production or raise prices arbitrarily.20 These principles
were stated by the Court in language broad enough to include
operations through holding companies or corporations under
group control; but it may be safely predicted that the closer the
approach to unity of interest in any given case the more search-
ing will be the scrutiny of the court to spell out of the transac-
tions an unlawful concert or agreement.
Very recently the Court also approved as lawful a plan per-
fected and carried out by a very large producer for fixing and
maintaining uniform prices to consumers throughout the country
by retention of title of the product in the producer until passed
to the ultimate consumer.2 The producer made uniform con-
tracts with retailers everywhere'to sell the particular product at
a fixed price as agent of the producer; and this was held by the
Court to be permissible even though such agency contracts im-
posed upon the retailer substantially all the ordinary risks of
ownership of the product and accorded the producer unusual
security for payment to it of the net proceeds.
But still later, the Court emphatically condemned a less
monopolistic achievement by a combination of corporations and
individuals whereby they directly fixed only a reasonable price
for their product.2 2  The Court refused to apply the "rule of
reason" to such direct price-fixing agreement and declared, that
2OTo the same effect see Cement Manufacturers' Protective Associa-
tion v. United States, (.1925) 268 U. S. 588, 45 Sup. Ct. 586, 69 L. Ed. 1104.
Justices McReynolds, Taft, and Sanford dissented.2
'United States v. General Electric Co., (1926) 272 U. S. 476, 47 Sup.
Ct. 192, 71 L. Ed. 221.
22United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., (1927) 273 U. S. 392, 47
Sup. Ct. 377, 71 L. Ed. 404. Justices Van Devanter, Sutherland and But-
ler dissented. Justice Brandeis took no part.
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agreements which create such potential power may well be held
to be in themselves unreasonable and unlawful restraints.
And then in the last reported case23 (prior to December 1,
1927) the Court, in refusing to dissolve a great but apparently
inoffensive combine as requested by the government, held again
that neither the size of a combination nor the existence in it of
unexerted power constitutes a violation of the Federal Anti-
Trust Act; and, further, that no suppression of competition or
sinister domination is to be inferred from the mere fact that
competitors see fit, in the exercise of their own judgment, to
follow the prices of others.
During the period of these outstanding decisions the Court
distributed lesser sign posts along the straight and narrow path
which big business is required to travel in its evolution to harm-
less perfection under the Sherman Act ;24 and also repeatedly
asserted the reserved right of the Court to decide each case
strictly upon its own merits and without much regard to the
language used in any prior decision where the Court may have
had either a particularly black or an unusually white trade com-
bination before it.
23United States v. International Harvester Co., (1927) 274 U. S. 693,
47 Sup. Ct. 748, 71 L. Ed. 852. justices McReynolds, Brandeis and Stone
took no part.24There can be no lawful combination to manipulate markets, Swift v.
United States, (1905) 196 U. S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct. 276, 49 L. Ed. 518, or to
destroy rivals by concerted refusal to trade, Binderup v. Path6 Exchange,(1923) 263 U. S. 291, 44 Sup. Ct. 96, 68 L. Ed. 308; or to quote specified
prices, Federal Trade Commission v. Pacific States Paper Trade Associa-
tion, (1926) 273 U S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct. 255, 71 L. Ed. 321; or to maintain
price levels by refusing to handle products of non-union labor, United
States v. Brims, et al., (1926) 272 U. S. 549, 47 Sup. Ct. 169, 71 L. Ed.
194; Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n., (1926)
274 U. S. 37, 47 Sup. Ct. 522, 71 L. Ed. 581; or to fix resale prices after
parting with title, Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, (1912)
226 U. S. 20, 33 Sup. Ct. 9, 57 L. Ed. 107; Boston Store v. American
Graphophone Co., (1918) 246 U. S. 8, 38 Sup. Ct. 257, 62 L. Ed. 531; Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons, (1911) 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376,
55 L. Ed. 502; or to limit imports, the parties to the combination being
within the United States, United States v. Sisal Sales Corporation, (1926)
274 U. S. 268, 47 Sup. Ct. 592, 71 L. Ed. 715; or to limit the employ-
ment of labor to members of the combination, Anderson v. Shipowners
Ass'n, (1926) 272 U. S. 359, 47 Sup. Ct. 125, 71 L. Ed. 168; or to boycott
manufacturers of commodities intended for interstate transportation,
Loewe v. Lawler, (1908) 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301, 52 L. Ed. 488;
or to buy up competitive industries under contracts restraining the sellers
from re-engaging in same business and obligating them to discourage
others from doing so, Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson, (1908) 209 U.
S. 423, 28 Sup. Ct. 572, 52 L. Ed. 865; or to prohibit retailers from selling
the goods of parties outside the combination, Standard Fashion Co. v. Ma-
grane-Houston Co., (1922) 258 U. S. 346, 42 Sup. Ct. 360, 66 L. Ed. 653.
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Cases arising from the Federal Trade Commission Act2" are
also significant where the decisions might have rested on the
anti-trust act; but as the chief purpose of the Federal Trade
Commission Act is to prevent unfair competition, 26 its interpre-
tation need not be here discussed.
The Clayton Act 2? must not be overlooked; but it is be-
lieved that trade organizations operating in harmony with the
Sherman Act will seldom be found transgressing the Clayton
Act.
28
State anti-trust acts may not be entirely ignored, but their
potency has been directly lessened by federal decisions attacking
their constitutionality 29 and indirectly weakened by other federal
decisions defining interstate commerce as including nearly all
commercial transactions which trade combinations of effective
size might influence.
30
Although irreconcilable and contradictory, the decisions justify
the conclusion that trade combinations of any size or kind may
25Act of Sept. 26, 1914, U. S. C. tit. 15, secs. 41-51, 15 U. S. C. A. secs.
41-51, Mason's Code, tit. 15, secs. 41-51.
26Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, (1926) 274 U. S. 145, 47 Sup.
Ct. 553, 71 L. Ed. 639.
27Act of October 15, 1914, U. S. C. tit. 15, secs. 12-26; U. S. C. tit 18,
sec. 412; U. S. C. tit. 28, secs. 381-83, 386-90; U. S. C. tit. 29, sec. 52, 15
U. S. C. A. secs. 12-26; 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 412; 28 U. S. C. A. secs. 381-83,
386-90; 29 U. S. C. A. sec. 52, Mason's Code, tit. 15, secs. 12-26; Mason's
Code, tit. 1, sec. 412; Mason's Code, tit. 28, secs. 381-83, 386-90; Mason's
Code, tit. 29, sec. 52.
2sStandard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., (1922) 258 U. S.
346, 42 Sup. Ct. 360, 66 L. Ed. 653; Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1922) 282 Fed. 81, where the court said:
"Therefore in determining whether given acts amount to unfair meth-
ods of competition within the meaning of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, or substantially lessen competition and tend to create a monopoly
within the meaning of the Clayton Act, the only standard of legality with
which we are acquainted is the standard established by the Sherman Act
in the words, 'restraint of trade or commerce,' and 'monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize' and by the courts in construing the Sherman Act with
reference to acts 'which operate to the prejudice of the public interest by
unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the due course of
trade' and 'restrict the common liberty to engage therein.'"
29Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., (1926) 274 U. S. 445, 47 Sup. Ct. 681, 71
L. Ed. 1146; Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, (1926) 274 U. S. 1, 47
Sup. Ct. 506, 71 L, Ed. 893, declaring unconstitutional a state statute forbid-
ding discrimination between different localities in prices paid. The Min-
nesota Act, Minn. G. S. 1923, sec. 3907, was substantially the same as the
California Act, Calif. Stat. 1913, chap. 276, which may now be also consid-
ered invalid.
30"Such commerce is not confined to transportation, but comprehends
all commercial intercourse between different states and all the component
parts of that intercourse. And it includes the buying and selling of com-
modities for shipment from one state to another." Butler, J. in Federal
Trade Commission v. Pacific States Paper Trade Association, (1926) 273
U. S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct. 255, 71 L. Ed. 321. See also Stafford v. Wallace,
(1922) 258 U. S. 495, 42 Sup. Ct. 397, 66 L. Ed. 735; United States v. Live
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be lawfully formed and operated for the purpose of effecting
economies in the cost of production, distribution and sale of
commodities through joint use or exchange of facilities, or elim-
ination of waste by quantity production and distribution, or by
any other method; that such trade combinations may acquire and
distribute among their members all available trade, business, eco-
nomic, or scientific information relating to production, distribu-
tion, sale or other disposal of their products, including studies
and analyses of probable requirements of consumers and their
ability and inclination to absorb such products from time to time,
and including anything else which may be of aid to its mem-
bers in the intelligent conduct of their business; that restraints
upon production and sale by the individual members of a com-
bination resulting from the effect upon their minds of such co-
operative activities are not undue or unreasonable restraints of
trade or commerce; and that co-operative efforts to adjust aggre-
gate production to consuming requirements, without creating arti-
ficial scarcity or maintaining artificial price levels or destroying
incentive for competition, are not prohibited by the Federal Anti-
Trust Act.
Nor is such co-operation among the members of a combina-
tion any the less lawful because it is accomplished with full
knowledge and realization by each member that the law does not
compel him or it to compete,"' or to produce a surplus, or to sell
for less than a reasonable profit; but on the contrary he or it may
limit production to any amount and sell or refuse to sell, at any
price, to any person, at any time, anywhere.32
But such trade combinations cannot lawfully pool profits, di-
vide trade territory, unduly oppress or destroy outside competi-
tors, or by any agreement or concerted action of their members
curtail production to less than consuming requirements, or artifi-
cially elevate prices.
To avoid attacks in the courts such trade combinations may
well refrain from integrating stock ownership of their corporate
members, or unifying or interlocking their directorates, or fos-
Poultry Dealers Ass'n., (D.C. N.Y. 1924) 298 Fed. 139; Williams v. United
States, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1923) 295 Fed. 302.
T'United States v. U. S. Steel Corp., (1920) 251 U. S. 417, 40 Sup. Ct.
293, 64 L. Ed. 343, where the Court said of the Sherman Act: "It does
not compel competition, nor require all that is possible."32Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, (1926) 270 U. S. 593, 46 Sup.
Ct. 367, 70 L. Ed. 750; Fed. Trade Commission v. Raymond, etc., (1924)
263 U. S. 565, 44 Sup. Ct. 162, 68 L. Ed. 448. The conclusions here stated
have no application to public service corporations.
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tering any other plan or scheme tending to destroy the individ-
ual capacity of their members to act independently and do busi-
ness normally. Good faith is the first requirement of courts not
confined within the circumscription of precedents.
Trade combinations which primarily limit their activities,
however complicated and involved, to lessening the cost of pro-
duction, distribution and sale of their products instead of in-
creasing the price to the consumer, will never fare ill in the
courts, even though the direct effect of their concerted effort is
to avoid overproduction, stabilize industry and markets, and
thereby lessen and restrain competition.
Adherence to these principles in the conduct of their activ-
ities may relieve trade combinations of some of the hazards aris-
ing from the reprehensible uncertainty of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act until Congress shall have seen the folly of attempting
by indirection to compel traders to strive wastefully for that
which they are forbidden to attain,83 and shall have undertaken to
regulate rather than annihilate mass production and sale of com-
modities in interstate and foreign commerce. But, if the con-
gressional mind too long wanders outside the realm of economic
reason, big business in retaliation may achieve complete and un-
regulated monopoly by consolidating ownership at the source of
production and selling at its own fixed price through retail agency
contracts.
34
.
3 3Monopoly is the logical sequel of successful competition. The stat-
ute attempts to compel traders to compete by forbidding them to agree not
to compete, and at the same time condemns the achievement of the monopoly
which results to the survivor of successful competition. In legal contem-
plation, therefore, competing traders are compelled to strive for a goal
which it is impossible to attain. The wastefulness of such legal require-
ments may be judged from and address of the secretary of the interior
before the American Bar Association at Buffalo, New York, in September,
1927, in which he stated that overproduction of crude oil in the United
States had reached the proportions of a national calamity involving an un-
precedented waste of natural resources of the country, A committee of
the American Bar Association had already formulated a report recommend-
ing amendment of the anti-trust laws of the country, and stating that the
committee believed the Sherman Act to be economically unsound and its
application to individual cases uncertain.24An achievement already accomplished as to one commodity. See
United States v. General Electric Company, (1926) 272 U. S. 476, 47 Sup.
Ct. 192, 71 L. Ed. 221. The danger of such consolidation is emphasized
in the dissenting opinion of Justices Brandeis and McKenna in American
Column .& Lumber Co. v. United States, (1921) 257 U. S. 377, 419, 42 Sup.
Ct. 114, 159, 66 L. Ed. 284, 299, closing with these words: "May not these
hardwood lumber concerns, frustrated in their efforts to rationalize com-
petition, be led to enter the inviting field of consolidation? And if they
do, may not another huge trust, with highly centralized control over vast
resources,-natural, manufacturing and financial,-become so powerful as
to dominate competitors, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, employees, and
in large measure, the community?"
